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Friday, 16 October 2026
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ZachXBT Accuses Garden Finance of Laundering Lazarus Group Funds

ZachXBT Accuses Garden Finance of Laundering Lazarus Group Funds

A major flashpoint erupted today in the decentralized finance (DeFi) world as renowned blockchain investigator ZachXBT took to X (formerly Twitter) to level serious allegations at Bitcoin bridge Garden Finance.

Over 80% of Fees Allegedly from Illicit Sources
In a June 21 post, ZachXBT asserted that more than 80% of Garden Finance’s recent fee revenue derived from transactions linked to stolen funds—specifically tied to the North Korean Lazarus Group and the massive Bybit hack. The transaction flow, he says, originated from Chinese-based laundering addresses funneling assets through Garden’s bridge.

 

📊 Behind the Numbers

  • Garden Finance’s Dune dashboard shows total swap volume near 24,984 BTC (~$1.5 billion), with 40.11 BTC collected in fees across ~40,571 swaps.

  • Over a 12-day window ending June 2, the protocol earned approximately 38.86 BTC (roughly $300,000), of which >80% allegedly came from illicit flows.

  • ZachXBT further reports that about $27.18 million—money tied to Lazarus-related hacks—was funneled through the platform.

⚠️ Decentralization Under Fire

ZachXBT criticizes Garden’s claim of being “decentralized” and “trust‑less,” pointing out what he calls a single actor repeatedly top‑uping cbBTC (Coinbase-Wrapped BTC) liquidity—essentially controlling critical capital reserves within the system. He challenges the platform's narrative by asking:

“Explain how it is ‘decentralized’ when I watched in real time for multiple days as a single entity kept topping up cbBTC liquidity…”

🔍 Garden Finance Responds

Co‑founder Jaz Gulati responded on X, acknowledging that Garden pulled in 30 BTC in fees prior to the Bybit hack, but labeled ZachXBT’s claims as misinformation and dismissed accusations of being a "fake decentralized" platform.

Garden promotes fast, zero‑custody cross-chain swaps in 30 seconds, with no central authority holding user funds.

 

🌐 Wider Context: Laundering Trends in Crypto Bridges

  • Chainalysis data for 2023: illicit addresses routed $743.8 million through DeFi bridges—a sharp increase from $312.2 million in 2022.

  • North Korean hacker groups, including Lazarus, are frequent bridge-to-bridge launderers—this aligns with the patterns seen in the Garden Finance allegations.

🧭 Implications & Stakeholder Reaction

  1. Reputational Risk
    A high‑profile blockchain sleuth like ZachXBT drawing attention could erode user trust and deter institutional partnerships.

  2. Regulatory Scrutiny
    As bridges are focal points for illicit flow, regulators may intensify oversight—especially if evidence confirms illicit sources compose a majority of user fees.

  3. Protocol Adjustments
    Bridge teams may move toward AML/KYT mechanisms, whitelisting of on‑ramps like Coinbase, or more decentralized liquidity provisioning.

  4. Community Watchfulness
    On‑chain analytics and transparency tools (e.g., Dune dashboards) will be critical. Garden’s on‑chain activity, particularly involving cbBTC, is likely to face deeper scrutiny.

🔮 What to Watch Next

  • Independent On‑chain Audits: Will third-party researchers verify the 80% figure or tie funds to Lazarus/WazirX thefts?

  • Garden’s Governance Response: Will the protocol implement stricter oversight, commit to addressing on‑chain centralization, or release full transparency reports?

  • Enforcement Moves: Will regulators or compliance bodies take action against Garden or its operators?

Today’s allegations by ZachXBT—if supported by on‑chain data—represent a dramatic turning point. The claim that a single DeFi bridge could be processing over 80% illicit transactions spotlights systemic vulnerabilities in the DeFi infrastructure. Garden Finance’s response and future transparency will be key to either rebuilding confidence or inviting deeper scrutiny from both users and regulators.

Stay tuned: this developing story could trigger real changes in how decentralized bridges are built—and regulated.